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Abstract
The Oregon Health Plan (OHP) has been widely heralded as an important innova-
tion in medical care policy and rationing. Oregon’s pioneering method of prioritiz-
ing funding for health care through systematic and public ranking of medical
services has drawn substantial international interest. This paper reviews the experi-
ence of the Oregon plan since it began operation in 1994. We argue that wide-
spread misconceptions persist about the significance of the OHP. In particular,
there is little evidence that the OHP has operated as a model of explicit rationing.
In reality, Oregon has not rationed services, nor has its policy of cutting public cov-
erage for services produced substantial savings. These findings have important im-
plications regarding the desirability and feasibility of adopting a policy of removing
items from the list of insured medicare services in Canada. Oregon’s experience
suggests that drawing the line on medicare coverage would be more difficult and
less financially rewarding than advocates claim.
The Oregon Health Plan (OHP) has been widely heralded as an innovationin health policy as the first public insurance program to ration medical careexplicitly, systematically and openly by denying coverage for health care
services. Consequently, the OHP has attracted substantial international attention,
especially from health systems such as the British National Health Service that are
engaged in debates over setting priorities for public coverage of medical services
within financial constraints. For many health care analysts, as well as providers,
Oregon stands out today as a pioneer in its willingness to embrace rationing and
make the hard decisions raised by the dilemmas of modern medicine. Indeed, the
Oregon story has seemed so compelling, and is by now so familiar, that it has at-
tained “nearly mythical status” in the international health policy community.1
At the same time, the Oregon plan has been beset by controversy regarding its
apparent embrace of rationing. From the beginning, what appeared to be brave in-
novation to some seemed to be dangerous and morally dubious experimentation to
others. The debate between advocates and critics of the OHP has continued to this
day, with the advocates of transparency pitted against the defenders of humane
treatment of the most disadvantaged.
Yet a substantial gap exists between widespread perceptions of the Oregon
model and its actual performance. Thus far, the reality of rationing has not lived up
to the rhetoric of either the supporters or the critics of the Oregon plan. To clarify
that experience for medical policy-making is the purpose of this article. In our con-
clusion, we suggest how this experience might be of particular relevance to Cana-
dian discussions of priority setting, the removal of items from the list of insured
medical services and the rationalization of policy-making within medicare.
The OHP: a brief history
The state of health care in Oregon first came to prominence in 1987 with the case
of Coby Howard, a 7-year-old boy diagnosed with leukemia. Howard required a
bone marrow transplant. The Oregon legislature, however, had decided earlier that
year not to fund transplant operations, which were an optional service at the discre-
tion of states under the Medicaid program that provides insurance to low-income
Americans. The state consequently refused to pay for the operation. The case drew
substantial media attention, and private efforts to raise money for the operation were
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undertaken, but Coby Howard died later that year before
sufficient funds were raised.2 In response to the Howard case,
an Oregon state representative introduced legislation to re-
store Medicaid funding for bone marrow transplants. How-
ever, the bill was opposed by John Kitzhaber, a former emer-
gency medicine physician and then president of the state
senate who later became Oregon’s governor. Kitzhaber
noted that in Oregon, as in all other US states, substantial
segments of the population were uninsured and lacked cov-
erage for even the most basic medical services. Kitzhaber
contended that, in this context, it made little sense for the
state to pay for costly services, such as transplants, that would
benefit relatively few Medicaid recipients. He argued that,
although Oregon could not conceivably afford to pay for
every medical care service for every person, it could expand
insurance to cover all the uninsured while controlling expen-
ditures if it was willing to ration care.2
In 1989, the Oregon legislature enacted a health reform
bill sponsored by Kitzhaber that aimed to extend insurance
coverage to all Oregonians. The bill contained 2 major
provisions: a mandate for private employers to provide
their workers with health insurance and an expansion of the
state Medicaid program to cover all people in the state be-
low the federal poverty line. At the time, Medicaid covered
only 42% of low-income Americans, and other states had
been tightening eligibility requirements in response to
growing program expenditures, thus adding to the already
substantial ranks of the uninsured in the United States. In
contrast, Oregon pursued a “pincer strategy” of expanding
both public and private sources of medical insurance to
produce a system of universal coverage. Oregon’s employer
mandate, which was beset by business opposition and ham-
pered by the election of a conservative Republican legisla-
tive majority in 1994, never received the federal waiver
necessary for its implementation. Consequently, Oregon’s
aim of achieving universal coverage, which is something
that no US state has yet attained, was not met. Yet the
state’s Medicaid reforms, after considerable national de-
bate, were approved by the Clinton administration, and the
OHP began operation in 1994.
Rationing as public policy: the list
The OHP expanded Medicaid to cover all state resi-
dents below the federally established poverty line. The
price for that expansion, though, was to be paid by ra-
tioning services. Oregon’s model of rationing revolved
around the creation of a list of medical services. A state-
appointed Health Services Commission
reduced over 10 000 medical procedures
to a list of 709 medical conditions and
their related treatments (known as “condi-
tion/treatment pairs”). Through a process
of community meetings, public opinion
surveys on quality of life preferences,
cost–benefits analyses and medical out-
comes research, the commission then
ranked these condition/treatment pairs ac-
cording to their “net benefit.”3 These
rankings were intended to reflect commu-
nity priorities regarding different medical
conditions and services, physicians’ opin-
ions on the value of clinical procedures
and objective data on the effectiveness of
various treatment outcomes. The list itself
was meant to create an objective and sci-
entific vehicle for setting priorities for
medical spending. The initial incarnation
of the rankings was generated by a mathe-
matical formula that integrated the data
from clinicians, the public and outcomes
research. Future reorderings and additions
of services were to be incorporated into
the list on the basis of that formula. The
Oregon approach to rationing, which si-
multaneously drew on public preferences
and cost–benefit analyses, thus repre-
sented an unusual marriage of health ser-
vices research and deliberative democracy
(Table 1).3
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Table 1: Rankings of 17 service categories under the Oregon Health Plan
Category Descriptions and examples
Essential services
  1. Acute fatal Treatment prevents death, with full recovery
  2. Maternity care Maternity and most newborn care
  3. Acute fatal Treatment prevents death, without full recovery
  4. Preventive care for
      children
Example: immunizations
  5. Chronic fatal Treatment improves lifespan and quality of life
  6. Reproductive services Example: contraceptive management
  7. Comfort care Palliative therapy for conditions in which death is
imminent
  8. Preventive dental care Example: cleaning and fluoride applications
  9. Proven effective
      preventive care for adults
Example: mammograms
Very important services
10. Acute nonfatal Treatment causes return to previous health status
11. Chronic nonfatal One-time treatment improves quality of life
12. Acute nonfatal Treatment without return to previous health status
13. Chronic nonfatal Repetitive treatment improves quality of life
Services valuable to certain individuals
14. Acute nonfatal Treatment expedites recovery from self-limiting
condition
15. Infertility services Example: in-vitro fertilization
16. Less effective preventive
      care for adults
Example: screening of nonpregnant adults for
diabetes
17. Fatal or nonfatal Treatment causes minimal improvement in quality
of life
Source: United States Office of Technology Assessment.3
The core idea behind the Oregon reforms was that the
legislature would decide each session how much money to
allocate for the OHP, and a line would literally be drawn
on the list according to how many services that allocation
covered. All the services above the line would be covered
by the state; however, the OHP would not pay for any of
the services below the line. Moreover, the legislature was
not permitted to reduce payments to medical providers nor
to cut people off from Medicaid coverage. In the event of a
financial shortfall, the choice was either to move higher up
the list, thereby excluding more services, or to earmark
more revenues for the program. The initial list touched off
a firestorm of national controversy. Some questioned the
ethics of rationing services only for the poor and predicted
that, over time, benefits would be increasingly reduced to
the point of inadequacy.4 Others questioned the logic of the
list itself, especially since its initial version produced some
rankings that defied common sense.5 In order to implement
the OHP, state policy-makers were forced to make changes
to satisfy federal administrators and public concerns about
quality of life for people with disabilities. Oregon has used
the list since 1994, with the most recent OHP benefit pack-
age in 1999 covering 574 of 743 conditions (Table 2).6 As
intended, the state legislature has been forced to draw a
line publicly in service coverage every 2 years (Table 3).
The OHP in operation
How has rationing that is based on the explicit ranking of
services worked in practice? International interpretations of
the Oregon model as an exemplar of policy innovation in
rationing still largely reflect impressions formed during the
debate over the plan’s enactment. This is unfortunate, be-
cause the implementation of the OHP bears little resem-
blance to that debate. Consequently, the significance of the
Oregon model has been widely misinterpreted.7 After
6 years of operation, 5 conclusions stand out about the
OHP.8–11 First, contrary to expecta-
tions, there has been no widespread
rationing of services in the state. The
total number of services excluded
from the list has been relatively small
and their medical value generally
marginal. Even as the state now seeks
federal approval to move the list up
10 spots, there is no targeting of
widely used, medically necessary ser-
vices. On the contrary, the benefit
package covered by the OHP under
its rationing system is more generous
than under the state’s old Medicaid
system, and for some crucial services,
such as mental health and dental
care, it is considered superior to
commercial insurance in Oregon.
The absence of wide-scale rationing
in Oregon, as well as the gap between impressions of the
plan and the reality of its operation, is illustrated by the fact
that coverage for transplants — which were singled out
rhetorically as a target for cutbacks by the plan’s architects
— is actually more generous and comprehensive today than
before the OHP rationing scheme was enacted.
Second, establishing an explicit limit on service coverage
is much more difficult in practice than in theory. Although
the Oregon legislature has drawn a line across the list of
prioritized services, that line has been rather fuzzy. Put
simply, many Medicaid recipients continue to receive ser-
vices that are supposedly excluded by the OHP. In large
part, this can be attributed to the reticence of providers
when it comes to abiding by the rules. The OHP pays for
all diagnostic visits and procedures even if treatment is not
covered, and physicians have taken advantage of this loop-
hole to provide uncovered medical services. Patients pre-
senting with comorbidities have also been diagnosed with
conditions covered by the list in efforts by physicians to se-
cure patients’ access to services below the line.
Third, Oregon’s system of priority setting through the
list has not produced significant savings. Administrators es-
timate that during its first 5 years of operation, the list
saved the state only 2% of total expenditures from the
amount that it would have spent under the previous
system.8 That the list has not produced generous savings
should not come as a surprise given the relative paucity of
services excluded. Nevertheless, Oregon has managed to
expand health insurance coverage to over 600 000 people,
reducing the state’s uninsured rate from 17% in 1992 to
11% by 1997 (Table 4).12 (This is an achievement that is
hardly exceptional by international standards, yet still qual-
ifies as impressive in the United States, where the national
rate of uninsurance exceeded 16% in 1998.) However, the
expansion of state insurance in Oregon was not funded by
rationing and savings from the list, as is commonly (and
mistakenly) assumed, but by raising revenues (primarily
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Table 2: The last 5 services covered by the Oregon Health Plan Benefit Package
and the first 5 noncovered services, October 1999
Ranking Diagnosis Treatment
570 Contact dermatitis and atopic dermatitis Medical therapy
571 Symptomatic urticaria Medical therapy
572 Internal derangement of knee and ligamentous
knee disruptions, grades II–III
Repair and medical therapy
573 Dysfunction of nasolacrimal system Medical and surgical treatment
574 Venereal warts excluding cervical condyloma Medical therapy
575 Chronic anal fissure Medical therapy
576 Dental services (e.g., broken appliances) Complex prosthetics
577 Impulse disorders Medical and psychotherapy
578 Sexual dysfunction Medical and surgical treatment
579 Sexual dysfunction Psychotherapy
Note: The 1999 Oregon Health Plan prioritization list ranks 743 conditions. The above 10 rankings represent the last 5
services covered by Oregon's benefit package and the first 5 noncovered services. In the 1999 list, 574 services were
covered.
Source: Oregon Health Services Commission.6
through a cigarette tax) and moving Medicaid recipients
into managed-care plans. The notion that rationing
through the list would produce enough savings for Oregon
to finance universal coverage has proven to be an illusion.
Fourth, the OHP has not operated as the scientific ves-
sel of rationing that it was advertised to be. Although initial
rankings were based in large part on mathematical values,
controversies around the list forced administrators to make
political concessions and move medical services “by hand”
to satisfy constituency pressures and the federal govern-
ment. Analyses of the original list have shown that subjec-
tive judgements, not the initial formula, are the primary in-
fluence on service rankings.3 Once the methodology of the
list was compromised, the aspiration that the list could
function as a self-regulating mechanism according to for-
mula had to be abandoned. New services and revised rank-
ings are determined according to the preferences of the
Health Services Commission. In short, the OHP provides
no evidence for the presumption that a working system of
medical service prioritization can be implemented on the
basis of available cost–benefit analyses and outcomes data.
Fifth, despite the OHP’s status as a celebrated US policy
innovation, no US state or other nation has emulated the
Oregon model. In part, this is because what other jurisdic-
tions presumed was the key to Oregon’s ability to expand
coverage — the list and a formulaic system for rationing —
turned out to be illusory. The real innovation in Oregon
has been drawing on public participation to build public
support and raising revenues for expanding insurance for
the poor (Table 5). It is also the case that the furor over the
Oregon plan has dissuaded others from similar efforts. The
considerable political controversy that comes with the deci-
sion to terminate coverage for medical services explicitly
and publicly is baggage that no other US state has been
willing to take on and few nations have found appealing.
Lessons for Canada
The extent of Canadian interest in removing items from
the list of insured services, or “delisting,” is not obvious, of
course. When he was Newfoundland’s premier, Brian To-
bin, citing the aging of the Canadian population and the fi-
nancial pressures of new technologies, publicly pondered
whether “new therapies that benefit the very few [should
be] insured by the government, even if they are very
costly?”13 Tobin’s premise, that delisting is a serious policy
option for “sustaining” medicare, is by no means the sub-
ject of Canadian consensus. But both delisting and the con-
comitant commitment to explicitness are so much part of
the international health policy discussion that Oregon’s re-
alities are worth pondering.
The most important lesson from the Oregon experience
for Canada, or any other industrialized democracy, is that
explicit delisting of services is unlikely to produce substan-
tial savings. Governments seeking such savings by opening
public debate on what services their health systems should
exclude are likely, we contend, to be disappointed. The
political paradox of rationing, as we term it, is that the more
public the decisions about priority setting and rationing,
the harder it is to ration services to control costs. Paradoxi-
cally, more discussion about setting substantial limits on
medicare’s benefit package could actually increase costs, as
it did in Oregon, because legislators and health ministers
are placed in the precarious position of confronting public
pressures not to cut services, as well as to include future
services. Indeed, the OHP moved debates over Medicaid
policy and service coverage from the quiescence of legisla-
tive corridors to the front pages of the state’s newspapers.
The prominence of public discussions in Oregon regarding
state health policy is quite rare by US standards, where
Medicaid policy-making generally receives scant public at-
tention.14 Thus, the OHP created what Canada already has,
namely, a policy-making process that inevitably leads to
high-profile media coverage and public debate over health
care.15
Yet, as the Oregon case demonstrates, that process does
not guarantee, and in fact may inhibit, the success of ex-
plicit efforts to cancel coverage for particular services.
That delisting is unlikely to succeed as a cost containment
strategy is supported by the British experience. In the Na-
tional Health Service, British health authorities initiated a
policy of no longer insuring certain services, only to re-
treat after several years back to the core benefits package.1
In New Zealand, a government-appointed commission
charged with defining a core benefits package for the pub-
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Table 4: Percentage of uninsured people in
Oregon and the United States, 1990–1998






Source: The Office for Oregon Health Plan Policy and Research.12
Table 3: Policy innovations associated with the Oregon
Health Plan
Rationing of medical services
• Using savings from rationing to expand insurance coverage
• Explicit rationing at the macrolevel of policy-making
Creation of a prioritized list
• Excluding all services below “the line”
• Publication of a ranked list of all services
Public involvement with health policy-making
• Community forums
• Incorporation of public values into rankings
Reliance on health services technology
• Systematic, objective model of priority setting
• Incorporation of outcomes research and cost–benefit analysis
lic insurance program failed to reach agreement and thus
refused to exclude any services.16 In the Netherlands, re-
formers have persistently appealed for explicit choice
about core benefits, without making a substantial change
in Dutch medical practices or outlays. These international
experiences were echoed in Ontario, where hospital and
physician services were reviewed with the aim of delisting
those of little or no value. However, the review ultimately
produced a small list of services to be cut whose cumula-
tive costs amounted to small change, but nonetheless gen-
erated considerable controversy (Steven Lewis, Access
Consulting Ltd., Saskatoon, Sask.: personal communica-
tion, 2000). In short, the appeal for transparency in med-
ical decision-making is like a zombie, an idea that refuses
to die despite its limited utility.
All of these experiences underline a point that many ad-
vocates of explicit rationing have so far largely ignored: the
more that rationing decisions are made public and explicit,
the less likely that a public insurance system is able to ra-
tion services. If cost containment is the goal, implicit ra-
tioning, when governments set budgetary caps and limit
the supply of costly technology, leaving most so-called bed-
side rationing decisions to physicians, is a more sound fi-
nancial strategy for Canadian policy-makers.
Although financial savings have been the primary ban-
ner for delisting, the rationalization of services has also
been touted as a benefit. Here the Oregon model offers a
decidedly mixed lesson. Guided by the list, the OHP ar-
guably offers a more sensible Medicaid benefits package to-
day than it did a decade ago, with more emphasis on mental
health and preventive services. On the other hand, rational-
ization of coverage has had little to do with scientific for-
mulae and more to do with the subjective judgements of
Oregon’s health administrators. Certainly, research on
clinical outcomes and quality of care can enlighten such de-
cisions. Yet ultimately, setting priorities on health care can-
not be systematically derived from cost–benefit analyses.
Moreover, there is a fundamental problem with the strat-
egy of excluding entire categories of services. Whereas
there may be wide agreement to exclude services of ques-
tionable medical necessity such as tattoo removal, agree-
ment on what is fair game for exclusion is not likely to
reach very far. There are few medical services for which no
substantial medical benefit will accrue to some patients. Ex-
cluding entire categories of services, regardless of individ-
ual circumstances, puts policy-makers in the uncomfortable
position of insuring medical care for patients unlikely to
benefit from covered services, while denying care to pa-
tients requiring services that are not covered. Such a policy
not only makes little sense, it is also, as the behaviour of
physicians in Oregon indicates, difficult to implement.
In sum, the OHP has not been the model of rationing
that its advocates hoped for or its critics feared. Rather,
Oregon’s experiment with an explicit process of ranking
services has underlined how difficult it is to draw the line
and cut off public coverage for services. The Oregon case
suggests that delisting is neither viable nor desirable as a
strategy for controlling medicare costs in Canada.
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Table 5: Operation of the Oregon Health Plan (OHP),
1994–1999
Absence of rationing
• No evidence of wide-scale service exclusion
• Physician noncompliance with rules
No rationing, no savings
• List has not generated substantial savings
• Expanded coverage funded not through rationing, but by general
revenues and managed care
Health services technology
• Rankings primarily influenced by subjective judgements
• Rationing has not operated according to an objective formula
Expanded coverage
• State's uninsured rate significantly reduced
• OHP has covered over 600 000 people
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